Criterios de rigor para intervenciones constructivistas

Abstract

This article reflects scientific rigor in qualitative research developed from a constructivist epistemology, specifically in intervention processes with individuals. Unlike the positivist paradigm, which seeks to be “objective” through statistical designs and reliable measurements, constructivism recognizes the subjectivity of both the observer and the observed, raising new questions about how to ensure rigor in knowledge generation. The central objective was to analyze how rigor criteria are established and met in constructivist research, where action and theory are intertwined. To this end, the following questions were posed: Does rigor lie in proving the transformation of the participant? How can this be guaranteed without resorting to objectivity? Is it possible to formulate valid hypotheses within this framework? The methodology used was qualitative, based on a dialogue with relevant constructivist authors such as Watzlawick, Nardone, García, Piaget, and von Foerster. Their contributions allow us to understand the role of communication, complexity, cognition, and second-order cybernetics in the construction of reality and in intervention processes. The results of this reflection show that rigor is not limited to proving transformations, but also requires systematically documenting the process, seeking to meet other criteria such as credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability of the findings. Furthermore, it is recognized that the hypotheses formulated in this paradigm are plausible and operational, rather than statistically verifiable, and that the transformation of the researcher is an inherent part of the process. In conclusion, adopting constructivism implies recognizing that knowledge is subjective and situated, which demands criteria of rigor distinct from those of positivism.